GREEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A TOOL FOR GREENING A SOCIETY
Itaru Nitta
Green Intellectual Property Project, Maryland, USA and Wakabayashi Intellectual Property Law,
Tokyo, Japan
The Green Intellectual Property Project can be reached at www.greenip.org or +1-301-468-7353
(Phone / Facsimile).
ABSTRACT
The aim of this article is to introduce a drastic reform into the present intellectual property
(IP) system that would encourage the development of a truly affluent society while keeping
the economic scale at a sustainable level. The resulting system or "Green Intellectual
Property (GIP) system" would stimulate the progress of "green intellectual creations"
including advanced technologies, social models and policies. In this article, "green" means
"sustainable development-oriented" or "affluent societies reaching beyond traditional
economic growth." The GIP system would divert a part of ample IP-related monetary flow or
a "GIP fee" toward a monetary pool or a "GIP trust fund" for greening a society. IP-related
monetary flow includes official fees, license royalties and IP infringement compensations.
From this trust fund, the system would provide "GIP financial aid." If an institution needed the
product or service of a green intellectual creation and was unable to afford access to that
creation because of capital shortage or lack of technology and a social model, the GIP
system would offer the necessary financial support in the form of a soft loan and grant for
formulating or purchasing that creation or a royalty assumption for introducing that creation.
While the GIP financial aid would enable the financially weak to access the necessary green
intellectual creations, this aid would also provide benefits to GIP fee payers because it would
guarantee that they are able to collect early investments for formulating a new creation even
when its users do not themselves have enough financial power. As a result, the GIP financial
aid would raise originators’ incentives to formulate further green intellectual creations even
when the market is not fertile. These effects would lead to an increase in the number of IP
applications, which would eventually amplify the financial resources in the GIP system itself
for further financial aid. This self-incentive feature of the GIP system allows us to view its aid
as a "green investment." Through these GIP fees and financial aid, the GIP system could
address three economic aspects: the sustainable constancy of economic scale, the just
distribution of intellectual wealth and the efficient allocation of intellectual creations. While
many criticize that the current IP system fails to deal with these economic aspects, the
proposed GIP system could handle them in three different ranges of economic scope: the
ecological, macro and microeconomic.
INTRODUCTION
The traditional forms of intellectual property (IP) rights include patents, trademarks, designs,
copy rights and geographic indications. Generally, IP rights are exclusive legal rights with a time
limit or “lawful temporary monopoly” that is granted for intellectual creations as a reward for first
formulating a creation and disclosing the information of that creation (for other definitions for IP
rights, See e.g., Idris, 2003). This definition means that the IP system works to balance
monopolizing intellectual creations and sharing their information. Namely, the monopolistic
principle of the IP system protects the originator’s creation from intellectual theft such as
unauthorized use and imitation. Contrarily, the sharing principle of the IP system compels an
originator to disclose full information of her creation to the public before obtaining an IP right. IP
proponents believe that these principles of the IP system contribute to the progress of human
welfare through the activation of intellectual creations because the monopolies of intellectual
creations inspire originators' incentives to formulate more intellectual creations. Moreover, the
disclosure of intellectual creations releases new information which can enable new originators
to formulate further creations. The disclosure of intellectual creations also causes different
originators to avoid repeating the same effort to formulate the same creation, thus avoiding the
waste of time and investment. Joseph A. Schumpeter and many neoclassical economists have
asserted that IP rights, especially patent rights, induce technological progress. Technological
progress increases labor productivity and creates new business and jobs, which strongly
stimulates economic growth (e.g., Schumpeter, 1934).
However, this neoclassical economic approach has provoked criticisms from three different
economic perspectives that the current IP system causes undesirable outcomes (Daly and
Farley, 2004). From the broadest perspective, an undesirable situation is concerned with the
scale of economy which ecological economists emphasize. Ecological economists point out a
complete lack of respect for a sustainable scale of economy in the present IP system because
the system is based entirely on traditional growth-oriented economics. From the second widest
view of economics, an undesirable situation is related to distribution of income and wealth,
which is what macroeconomists address. Macroeconomists argue that the existing IP system
prevents a society from achieving just distribution of income and wealth because IP monopolies
promote the concentration of capital by an owner of an IP right. Increased capital concentration
is the financial driving force for further intellectual creations, yet increased capital results in a
larger gap between the rich and the poor. From the narrowest viewpoint, an undesirable
situation is involved with the allocation of resources, which is what microeconomists focus on.
Microeconomists claim that the IP system inevitably results in inefficient allocation in the market,
which originates with IP monopolies. While the information of intellectual creations is originally
intangible and therefore a free-accessible good, the IP system makes this information
inaccessible, which then leads to inefficient allocation of information in the market with higher
market prices than the equilibrium prices.
In contrast to these negative features, I have revealed positive features of the present IP system;
namely, the IP system has an unexamined but firm potentiality to propel the attainment of
sustainable development beyond mere stimulation of intellectual creations (Nitta, 2005). In an
earlier article, I have proposed drastic reform of the present IP system that would help society to
reduce environmental impact (Nitta, 2005). We could call the reformed IP system a "green IP
(GIP) system." Throughout the present article, "green" means "sustainable development-
oriented" or "affluent societies reaching beyond traditional economic growth." As a subsequent
study to my earlier proposal, this article demonstrates that the GIP system can circumvent
undesirable situations caused by the current IP system, and furthermore, the GIP system
strongly promotes the "greening" of a society. For this demonstration, we will begin with
arguments about the necessity of intellectual progress and the mechanism of the GIP system
which is generalized to include all forms of intellectual property. Subsequently, we will elucidate
the superiorities of the GIP system and its compatibility with economics.
GREEN INTELLECTUAL CREATIONS
To realize sustainable development, Herman Daly and other ecological economists have
affirmed that a society should reduce its economic scale to a sustainable level and keep that
scale at a constant where births are equal to deaths at the lowest rate and the input (depletion)
of resources into a society is equal to the output (pollution) of wastes to the environment at the
smallest amount. Ecological economists refer to this economic situation as the "steady-state
economy" (See, e.g., Daly and Townsend, 1993a). However, since the current growth-oriented
economy ultimately originates with humankind's inherited desire to progress, blind restriction on
the growth of human population and resource consumption cannot fulfill a constant economic
scale for sustainable development. Even extreme environmental protectionists do not think that
we should revert our standard of living back to the Stone Age in order to preserve or conserve the
natural environment. Most people, including economic growth liberalists and environmental
protectionists, want to enjoy the benefits of progress. To progress while keeping the economic
scale constant, we have to recognize that this constancy prohibits a society from increasing
population and throughputs (consumption) of resources; however, this does not mean that we
must deny the development of a more sophisticated society and higher quality of life. Daly
emphasizes the contrast between growth and development; namely, while growth makes
something bigger, development makes something better (Daly and Townsend, 1993b).
Distinguishing between growth and development brings us to a conclusion -- a feasible and
probably the sole way for us to progress while keeping the economic scale constant is not
making society's activities bigger but making them better, i.e., developing a truly affluent society
without increasing the consumption of resources. An affluent society is a society that provides
efficient and high-quality goods and services, which allows us to enjoy mental satisfaction, moral
progress and improved "art of life" (as proposed by John Stuart Mill) rather than the superficial
benefits of economic growth (Mill, 1848).
Much empirical evidence shows that the development of a society highly depends on the
progress of intellectual creations such as comprehensive technologies and broad-perspective
policies. In addition, the development of a society needs firm social system infrastructures and
institutions in order for us to do anything in that society because stable enforcement of well-
established social rules is a prerequisite for effective social development. We could call these
social systems and institutions "social models." These social models along with technologies
and policies comprise three major elements of intellectual creations. In particular, intellectual
creations for greening a society or "green intellectual creations" include three different types:
"green technologies," "green social models" and "green policies." These types can be
systematically defined according to the range of social scope, and they are essential to the
development of an affluent society with a constant economic scale.
Green Technologies
Green technologies are the narrowest-range green intellectual creations. They are concrete and
intensive technologies directed toward individual social phenomena, and they fall into two basic
classes. The first class is concerned with the traditional eco-friendly technologies such as those
related to output-reduction and input-reduction. Output-reduction technologies reduce
environmental pollutions. They typically include pollution control and technologies for the
restoration and remedy of environmental harms. Input-reduction technologies reduce resource
consumption in a society. They include technologies for efficiency improvement in resource
usage, reuse and recycling, renewable resources, environmental impact assessment, as well
as the precaution and prevention of environmental harms. While many researchers have
focused on output-reduction technologies, more effective green technologies are involved in
input-reduction. Input-reduction leads to a decrease in consumption of materials and energy
and curbs both depletion and pollution in the environment (e.g., McKinney and Schoch, 2003).
The second class of green technologies contributes to greening a society with more
comprehensive measures. These technologies are generally involved in human necessity, for
example medicine and health, hygiene, geriatric care, agriculture, foodstuff, juvenile and adult
education, poverty alleviation and infrastructures for human life. In addition, the second class is
related to social service improvements such as information and communications, social impact
assessment, the precaution and prevention of social harms as well as the restoration and
remedy of social harms.
Green Policies
Green policies are the broadest-range green intellectual creations. They are abstract and
extensive policies in politics and macroeconomics that provide guidelines for greening a
society. The primary example of green political policies is international environmental laws,
which include treaties, customary law, general principles and prevalent publications including
judicial decisions and the writings of eminent publicists (Article 38(1) of the International Court of
Justice Statute). A treaty is the written form of an international agreement between states (Article
2.1(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), and that form need not be called a treaty;
it can be called a convention, declartion, protocol, communique, agreement, or virtually any other
name (Hunter, et. al., 2002a). The two biggest international environment treaties are the
Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Agenda 21). Customary law is the unwritten
form of an empirical rule that states regularly obey. An example of customary law is the UN Law
of the Sea Convention. The general principles of international law are aspects in common that
states share such as the “Right to a Healthy Environment.” Green political policies also include
domestic environmental law, protocols and rules such as the U.S. Sky Trust.
On the other hand, green macroeconomic policies are the intellectual creations that address
sustainable scale of economy and just distribution of incomes and welfare. They also
encompass nonmarket goods and services which truly enhance human welfare. These targets
of green macroeconomic policies are mostly those which the market fails to deal with. One of
the best examples of green macroeconomic policies is the concept of the steady-state economy,
which we have already discussed. Another example of green macroeconomic policies is the
“principle of subsidiarity,” which was originally derived from a Catholic tenet, emerged through
the European integration and now functions in the present European Union (EU). This principle
means that what can be well done by a smaller and simpler institution should not be done by a
larger and more complex institution. Namely, we should solve local problems not with global
measures but local measures -- the EU government handles only the global EU's issues, and
local issues should be addressed by local governments.
Green Social Models
As we have seen, green intellectual creations include at least two elements: green technologies
as the narrowest creations and green policies as the broadest. To support the practical
applications of green technologies and the implementation of green policies, we additionally
introduce a middle-range creation: green social models. Since green policies provide only
general guidelines and they do not bestow specific instructions, we need green social models, i.
e., social systems and institutions that provide concrete procedures for the achievement of green
policies. Additionally, green social models could guide the trend of green technologies by acting
as super controls of technological developments to point technological progress in the right
direction. In this situation, green social models could be regarded as converters of philosophies
in green policies to green technologies which actually affect our lives.
A typical example of social models is the Official Development Assistance (ODA). The ODA is an
international institution that distributes financial and technological aid through the government or
governmental agencies of several developed countries including US, Japan and Germany. The
first-ever international organization for ODA was the Organization for European Economic Co-
operation (OEEC), which was established in 1948 with support from the US and Canada for the
reconstruction of Europe after World War II. In 1961, the OEEC expanded to include US and
Canada and became the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
ODA from the OECD was originally the social model to implement a governmental policy, the
Marshall Plan. ODA is also a social model to guide practical applications of various
technologies through vast financial aid provided by developed countries to developing countries.
This situation allows us to conceive of ODA as a kind of social models that has successfully
converted a public policy (the Marshall Plan) into technological progress through financial aid.
Another example of green social models is international financing institutions for protection of
the global environment. These institutions include pioneers that have already proven to be
useful such as the fledgling "micro-credit" programs (for example, the Grameen Bank), debt-for-
nature swaps (for example, that of the Beni River Region, Bolivia, by Conservation International,
USA) and national environmental funds. The green institutions also include usefulness-
unproven proposals such as the "Tobin Tax" and the Global Commons Trust Fund (Hunter, et.
al., 2002b).
GREEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (GIP) SYSTEM
As we have discussed, the major elements of green intellectual creations are advanced
technologies, social models and policies. Through strong progress in the formulation, practical
applications and wider prevalence of these intellectual creations, the ultimate objective of the
green intellectual property (GIP) system is to attain the development of a truly affluent society
while keeping the economic scale at a sustainable level. For this purpose, the GIP system
would divert a part of ample IP-related monetary flow or a "GIP fee" toward a monetary pool for
greening a society or a "GIP trust fund" (Nitta, 2005). IP-related monetary flow could include
official fees, license royalties and IP infringement compensations. IP applicants would pay a GIP
fee when they take a legal action to obtain an IP right and IP owners would also pay a GIP fee
when they earn income from a royalty and compensation. From the GIP trust fund, the GIP
system would provide financial aid for the formulation, practical applications and wider
prevalence of green intellectual creations. Specifically, if someone needed the product or service
of a green intellectual creation and such person was unable to afford to access that creation
because of capital shortage or lack of technology and a social model, the GIP system would offer
the necessary financial support in the form of a royalty payment for introducing that creation or a
soft loan and grant for formulating or purchasing that creation.
Establishing the GIP Trust Fund
A present, the current IP system has the superior ability to establish a GIP trust fund; namely, the
system has ample financial resources which are supported by the pro-patent policy within an
internationally-harmonized framework of strictly enforced laws (Nitta, 2005). In the case of the
patent system, the abundant financial resources of this system can be represented by the
statement, "a patent law is a law for rich people." These words mean that major players in the
present patent system are those who have enough financial power to create an invention and
then obtain and maintain its patent right. They pay various official fees that provide huge
amounts of revenue to the patent system. For example, the revenue of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) in 2004 was $230 million including $180 million (78%) of the
official fees for the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) applications (the author converted the
original Swiss franc to US dollar from the data of WIPO, 2005). The WIPO also predicts that its
total income will increase in the next five years based on the increase in PCT applications. In
another example, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) earned a total of $1.2
billion including $1.0 billion from patent official fees in the fiscal year 2003 (USPTO, 2004). Like
the WIPO, the USPTO also predicts that their total income will increase in the next several years
based on the increase in patent applications in and toward the US. These data indicate that
even just two patent offices' income will reach roughly $2 billion in the coming years from patent
applications alone. If the patent system allocated even a small portion of its vast income as the
GIP fees, the system could provide substantial financial resources to establish the GIP trust fund
without soliciting additional official fees.
Although the current official fees could already provide considerable revenue to the proposed
patent system, a hike of these fees would be relatively easy in the form of the GIP fees if the GIP
trust fund required more financial resources. For example, one patent application for one
invention in one foreign country costs roughly $6,000 which contains only $1,500 in official fees
and $4,500 that goes toward other expenditures such as translation and attorney fees (based on
the author's experiences). Because official fees are a much smaller part of the total cost, a
certain percentage increase in official fees would not appear to an applicant as a significant rise
of the total cost to obtain a patent right.
In addition to the income from official fees, the patent system has other potential financial
resources that could be generated by the monetary flows concerning patent activities. An
example of the patent-related monetary flows is royalty payment for a patent license from a user
to an owner. Another example is compensation payment for a litigation from a patent infringer to
an owner. These patent-related monetary flows provide industrial corporations a huge amount
of patent income. For example, in 2003, IBM earned $900 million in patent income, which is
equal to 1% of its total income of $90 billion (IBM, 2003). These patent incomes are equivalent
or more than the current revenues of the patent system from official fees. For the GIP trust fund,
the patent system could collect a part of these patent incomes in the form of green fees from
successful patentees.
Promoting Green Intellectual Creations
From the GIP trust fund, the GIP system would offer financial aid to promote green intellectual
creations in three different measures: the spread of existing creations, the practical application of
fledgling creations and the formulation of new creations. Looking at an example of the first
measure, in order to distribute already-established creations such as an HIV medicine, the
royalty for that HIV medicine could be paid by the GIP system rather than the medicine's users
such as African countries that cannot afford to pay. This royalty assumption by the GIP system
would strongly promote the distribution of green intellectual creations by two adroit features. The
first feature is the reconciliation between environmental protectionists (usually including green
creation's users) and growth liberalists (frequently including GIP fee payers such as IP
applicants and owners). While this royalty assumption would enable the financial weak to
access the necessary green intellectual creations, the assumption would also provide benefits
to GIP fee payers because the royalty assumption by the GIP system would guarantee that they
would be able to collect early investments for formulating a new creation even when its users do
not themselves have enough financial power. In other words, the royalty guarantee would justify
the GIP fees for GIP fee payers in a remarkable contrast to ordinary green taxes, which
unilaterally burden tax payers.
The second feature of the royalty assumption by the GIP system is the arousal of further green
intellectual creations that are not profitable for an IP owner but essential for greening a society.
For example, within the present framework of the existing IP system, pharmaceutical companies
may shift their development activities from an HIV medicine to more profitable medicines such
as an antipodagric for rich man's gout because rich men with gout in developed countries have
more money than HIV patients in developing countries. However, if the GIP system guaranteed
the royalty for an HIV medicine, pharmaceutical companies should shift their activities back to an
HIV medicine. Generally, the royalty guarantee would raise originators’ incentives to formulate
further green intellectual creations even when the market is not fertile. Since most markets of
green intellectual creations are still immature and many green creation's users do not have the
sufficient financial capacity to introduce green creations, the GIP system's guarantee would serve
as a catalyst for a wider prevalence of green intellectual creations.
In the second and third measures of financial aid from the GIP trust fund, the GIP system would
encourage the formulation of new green intellectual creations and the practical application of
fledgling creations as is the case with the prevalence of existing creations such as an HIV
medicine. For example, the system would provide soft loans or grants to assist basic research
for the formulation and launching new green creations which no society possesses but every
society needs. These green creations include novel green technologies (e.g., satellite
photovoltaic and nuclear fusion power generation), social models (e.g., a new financial
mechanism) and policies (e.g., a new treaty). In addition, the soft loans or grants from the GIP
system would also promote the practical usage of green intellectual creations which were
already formulated but have not matured yet. For instance, the GIP system would help users
purchase nascent but seminal green technologies such as solar and wind power generation.
Although these technologies usually have high prices due to IP protections and the small scale
of production, the GIP system’s financial aid could expand the market shares of such
technologies. This expansion induces mass-production of green technologies and decreases
the price of green technologies. As a result, the GIP system would effectively promote the
practical application of fledgling technologies in a society. Furthermore, the GIP system would
financially support the practical progress of trailblazing social models (for example, micro-credit
programs and debt-for-nature swaps) and polices. Through the encouragement of the formation
and application of these green creations, the soft loans and grants from the GIP system would
accomplish the reconciliation between GIP fee payers and users while stimulating the
development of green creations. These features are similar to those of royalty assumption.
Namely, the GIP system's soft loans and grants could stimulate users' intentions to purchase
green creations, which would expand the reach of emerging creations in a society. This would
provide benefits to GIP fee payers and inspire originator’s motivation for the formulation of further
green creations.
While distributing, maturing and formulating green intellectual creations, the financial aid from
the GIP trust fund would function as a self-amplifying investment which could address two major
root-causes of worldwide unsustainable growth: poverty in developing countries and
consumption in developed countries. To curb poverty-induced unsustainable growth in
developing countries, the GIP system would help developing countries introduce green
intellectual creations from developed countries. To reduce consumption-induced unsustainable
growth in developed countries, the GIP system would assist the formulation of new green
creations and the maturation of emerging creations. These financial supports from the GIP
system would expand green intellectual creations, which would enlarge the reach of green
intellectual creations in a society. This reach would lead to an increase in IP applications for the
GIP system. As a result, the increase in the number of IP applications would eventually amplify
the financial resources in the GIP system itself for further financial aid. This self-incentive feature
of the GIP system allows us to view its aid as an investment or a "green investment." This is
because these green investments would possess the same characteristics as ordinary loan
investments, which increase their original financial resources through interest. Contrarily, the
green investment would differ from ordinary green taxes, which do not increase their original
funds. In addition, the green investment would require, if needed, only a slight increase in the
total cost for obtaining an IP right and would not increase market prices in contrast to the
conventional green taxes, which internalize environmental externalities into market prices. While
a price increase due to a market-based internalization discourages the market, a non-price-
increase process through the proposed GIP system could encourage the green market while
keeping the economic scale at a sustainable level by promoting green intellectual creations.
That is to say, this non-price-increase process would provide a reconciliation for the conflict
between economic growth liberalists and environmental protectionists because such a process
would promote green intellectual creations without apparently suppressing the market. In
accordance with the desires of both liberalists and protectionists, the GIP system would provide
an approach to the development of an affluent society.
COMPATIBILITY OF THE GIP SYSTEM WITH ECONOMICS
In addition to the superiorities of the GIP system as we have argued, this system has a
remarkable compatibility with economics. Simply put, the GIP system could address the
sustainable constancy of economic scale, the just distribution of intellectual wealth and the
efficient allocation of intellectual creations. While many criticize that the current IP system fails to
deal with these economic aspects, the proposed GIP system could handle them in three
different ranges of economic scope: the ecological, macro and microeconomic scopes.
Pigouvian Effect: An Ecological Economic Aspect
From the broadest perspective of economics -- ecological economics -- the GIP system would
respect the sustainable scale of economy; namely, the system would have a limiting effect on the
scale of economy in a similar manner to the Pigouvian scheme. The Pigouvian scheme
requires the market to reflect neglected external costs. Once the market appropriately reflects all
these costs, it will spontaneously establish the efficient allocation of resources by achieving an
equilibrium between marginal social costs and benefits as a result of the Pareto optimum
(Pigou and Aslanbeigui, 2002). Internalizing external costs raises market prices and curbs
haphazard economic growth. Consequently, this internalization contributes to the attainment of a
constant scale of economy, and the sustainable constancy of economic scale is one of the major
concerns to ecological economists.
Within the Pigouvian scheme, one of the most notable social models is the Pigouvian tax, the
origin of present-day green taxes. The imposed Pigouvian tax is theoretically equal to marginal
external costs in order for the market to internalize externalities. The GIP fees for the proposed
GIP trust fund could be conceived as a pseudo-Pigouvian tax. This is because, even though the
GIP fees would not directly raise market prices, the fee payment would be a pathway to
internalize two kinds of external costs with which the current IP system has been involved. The
first category of such costs is "IP-nonspecific external costs." These are general external costs
attributed to inherent market failure. Products and services in any market ignore some external
costs because it is virtually impossible for the existing market system to consider all these costs
for a certain product or service. This is also true of the products and services that an IP right
protects; namely, IP-protected products and services inherently overlook external costs because
any activities of the IP system are based on these IP-protected products and services.
The second category of external costs that the IP system has been related to is "IP-specific
external costs." These costs are generated by the IP-system's ability to increase capital intensity
through monopolies. These monopolies help to concentrate capital or increase capital intensity
for a monopoly owner, and this heightened capital intensity then enables that owner to invest in
further development. Such IP-driven development results in consuming more resources and
generating more external costs. In this way, the IP system generates not only IP-nonspecific
external costs, but also extra IP-specific external costs. These costs could be internalized by the
payment of the GIP fees under the proposed system.
By looking at these external costs from an ethical perspective, a society should force the IP
system to pay a compensation for environmental and social degradation in the form of GIP fees.
The present IP system has contributed to environmental and social degradation through the
promotion of haphazard growth. Environmental and social degradation includes not only
traditional environmental threats but also social problems such as poverty, refugees, famine,
pestilence and war. This observation raises at least two arguments, especially for the present
patent system. First, the patent system has a responsibility to protect the environment and
society because the system is ultimately founded on sacrifices of the environment and society.
That is to say, the patent system encourages technological progress, and technological
progress stimulates economic growth as indicated by the endogenous economic growth model,
which states that technological progress induces more economic growth, which then results in
more technological progress (See e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1997). In this way, the patent system
activates economic growth, and economic growth causes environmental and social
degradation. Therefore, the patent system should pay the costs of such degradation in the form
of the GIP fees.
As for the second argument from an ethical perspective, developed countries carry the entire
responsibility to protect the global environment and society because they have enough financial
resources which the patent system has rendered as a result of the past and present sacrifices of
the global environment and society. In other words, developed nations are the beneficiaries of
the patent system. Therefore, these beneficiaries of the patent system -- patent applicants and
patentees in developed countries -- must pay compensation for the global environmental and
social degradation.
In addition to the tax, another notable social model of the Pigouvian scheme is the Pigouvian
subsidy. The Pigouvian subsidy is a society's payment as a reward to the social unit that
reduces external costs. The amount of the Pigouvian subsidy is ideally equal to the marginal
external costs that a social unit successfully reduces. The financial aid from the proposed GIP
trust fund would be nothing more than a Pigouvian subsidy because the GIP system would
provide such aid to users who reduce external costs by utilizing green intellectual creations.
Since the GIP fee and GIP financial aid would be a form of Pigouvian tax and subsidy
respectively, the GIP system as a whole would possess both features of these Pigouvian social
models. Moreover, the combination of these models would render the GIP system a remarkable
advantage which we could call the "Pigouvian effect." For example, some may criticize the GIP
fee because it could curb IP applications, and this curb might impede the progress of not only
traditional growth-oriented creations but also green intellectual creations. This criticism
ostensibly makes sense; however, the GIP system would actually inhibit only growth-oriented
creations and conversely promote green intellectual creations. This selective incentive for green
intellectual creations is the Pigouvian effect, which is a result of the combination of the GIP fee
(the Pigouvian tax) and the financial aid from the GIP trust fund (the Pigouvian subsidy). This is
because the GIP trust fund would guarantee an IP owner's collection of early investment in the
form of royalty payments while at the same time inspiring users' incentives to purchase creations
as long as those creations are green. In this circumstance, if the total amount of an applicant's
budget were limited and the GIP fee increased the total cost of all IP applications, applicants
would decrease the applications of growth-oriented creations and maintain or, if possible,
increase the applications of green intellectual creations. In other words, the Pigouvian effect
would encourage originators to formulate more green intellectual creations rather than traditional
growth-oriented creations. As a result, the GIP system could selectively expand green
intellectual creations.
Wealth Re-Distributor: A Macroeconomic Aspect
From the middle perspective of economics -- macroeconomics -- the GIP system would facilitate
a society achieving just distribution of income and wealth while increasing the concentration of
capital by the owner of an IP right. This phenomenon is attributed to the fact that the payment of
the GIP fees would set an upper limit on IP-related income, which corresponds to a
macroeconomic procedure known as "capping income and wealth." A traditional example of a
capping procedure is a tax for income and wealth, such as real estate, tangible properties and
heirlooms. These income taxes would be comparable to the GIP fee. A successful IP owner
acquires a huge amount of IP income from a royalty when that owner licenses an IP right. An IP
owner also obtains vast compensation for infringement on an IP right when that owner wins an
IP infringement suit. When an IP owner acquires these IP-related incomes, the GIP system
would demand that owner to pay the GIP fee based on the same logic of the ability-to-pay
principle for a regular income tax.
On the other hand, the GIP financial aid corresponds to another macroeconomic procedure
known as "guaranteeing minimum income," because the GIP financial aid would assist users to
access the necessary green creations. This guaranteeing procedure generally sets a lower limit
on individual income and wealth. Typical examples of guaranteeing procedure include welfare
programs in which a society provides monetary and material aid, unemployment insurance,
medical insurance and minimum wage.
Since the proposed capping and guaranteeing procedure would force the IP system to release
IP-related wealth to the economic weak who need green intellectual creations, the GIP system
could be regarded as a wealth re-distributor. By setting an upper and lower limit of income and
wealth, a wealth re-distributor would decrease the gap between the rich and the poor, which
would lead to just distribution of income and wealth in accordance with the principal aspect of
the macroeconomic policies.
There are at least two reasons why just distribution of income and wealth is critical to greening a
society. First, those who are too poor cannot afford to care about the environment and society.
Second, those who are rich tend to consume a large amount of finite resources. Poverty in
developing nations and resource consumption in developed nations are two major factors for
unsustainability. Nearsighted approaches for poverty alleviation urge developing countries
toward growth-oriented macroeconomic policies, which ignore environmental and social
concerns. To earn foreign currency for eliminating poverty, many developing countries depend
heavily on the exploitation and export of their natural resources. These exported resources allow
free consumption of natural resources in developed countries without respect for environmental
impact. From an ethical perspective, distribution policies should not deprive people of what they
have earned; however, people should pay a fair fee for what they have received from the
environment and society.
To reduce the gap between the rich and the poor for just distribution at a global level, the Rio
Earth Summit Secretariat estimated that developing countries annually need financial aid in the
amount of $125 billion from the international community (Agenda 21, Chapter 33.18, Financial
Resources and Mechanisms). However, the total ODA from OECD countries in 2004 reached
only $78.6 billion, and Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden were still
the only countries to meet the UN's ODA target of 0.7% of gross national income (DAC, 2005).
Moreover, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) is the largest international financial institution
specializing in technological adoption for the implementation of specific environmental
obligations, yet the GEF has provided only $4.5 billion in grants since 1991 (GEF, 2004). To
complement these existing financial mechanisms, the GIP system, an international wealth re-
distributor, would collect a part of IP-related wealth through each country's patent office or an
international patent organization such as WIPO or the World Trade Organization (WTO). Then,
the GIP system would distribute collected wealth through multilateral development banks such
as the World Bank or local financial institutions such as a micro-credit bank or debt-for-nature
swaps in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. Moreover, a new international funding
organization based on incomes from the IP system could be established through the initiative of
three leaders in the IP system, i.e., the US, the EU and Japan.
Accessibility Reinstatement and Responsibility Shift: A Microeconomic Aspect
Economics at the narrowest perspective is microeconomics, and one of the major objectives in
microeconomics is the efficient allocation of goods and services in the market. The GIP system
would contribute to the achievement of efficient allocation of intellectual resources through two
measures. The first measure would be the reinstatement of accessibility for green intellectual
creations while maintaining IP monopolies; namely, the GIP financial aid would reinstate
accessibility for the green creations to which the present IP monopolies block free access. IP
monopolies are the main engine for originator’s incentives for formulating new creations.
However, these monopolies make resulting creations inaccessible to unauthorized users, and
this inaccessibility prevents the market from functioning efficiently. For example, IP
inaccessibility allows an IP owner to set any desired price for that owner's creation, which is
usually much higher than the equilibrium price in an efficient market. This higher price inhibits
the smooth distribution of creations, which leads to their inefficient allocation. To eliminate the
inaccessibility caused by IP monopolies, the proposed GIP system would provide financial aid
that would make green intellectual creations accessible to aid recipients. Aid recipients could
pay royalty and purchase green creations to incorporate such creations into their society. This
reinstated accessibility would result in a smooth distribution of creations, which would then
realize efficient allocation of those creations in the market.
The second measure for efficient allocation would be a shift of responsibility for environmental
and social costs from society to IP applicants and owners. In order for IP applicants to establish
monopolies in the current system, their duty includes the payment of official fees and the
disclosure of intellectual creations, yet it does not contain the payment of IP-specific and IP-
nonspecific external costs. This situation demands that society pay those external costs despite
the fact that such costs have been generated by the IP system. In contrast, the proposed GIP
system would shift the responsibility for paying these costs from society to IP applicants and
owners. This responsibility shift would induce the effective internalization of IP-specific and IP-
nonspecific external costs. This internalization would release a society from unjust burden to
pay those IP external costs, which would lead that society to improved allocation of its financial
resources. By using financial resources that are no longer required for IP external costs, a
society could spend more expenditure for greening that society.
Even though the proposed GIP system would contribute to efficient allocation, some economists
may still question the necessity of the IP system, particularly the patent system, because of
several technologies such as computer software and electronics that patent-free industrial-
standard policies have successfully distributed (e.g., Bollier, 2003). However, patent-free
industrial-standard policies are usually of benefit only if a supplier has enough capital resources
to quickly penetrate its new technologies into the market. In contrast, we could easily predict that
capital-short but forward-thinking suppliers would develop many green technologies. These
suppliers need protections of their inventions through a patent system which would provide
financial resources for the development of green technologies. Moreover if the present patent
system did not exist, most suppliers would keep their technologies as trade secrets and people
would not be able to access or even learn those technologies until they became out-of-date and
suppliers disclosed them. This situation would result in more serious inefficiencies in the
market than the situation of the present patent system because most technologies are alive for
longer than the patent term which is usually 20 years.
However, even pro-patentists have argued whether patent monopolies actually contribute to the
progress of science and technology. Some inventors can be stimulated by patent monopolies,
but others, especially capital-short but forward-thinking suppliers, might be disappointed
because they could think that much research has already been done by giant enterprises. They
also might think that they could hardly create anything new that the giants do not already have a
patent on. This means that patent monopolies may eliminate the possibility of technological
progress. From the perspective of sharing information, it is preferable that anyone freely access
any useful invention. To overcome this contradiction caused by patent monopolies, the patent
system prescribes disclosure of inventions. Disclosure of inventions enables subsequent
inventors to catch up quickly to others with existing patents and overtake them.
To obtain a patent right, the invention should be disclosed to the public. Since the disclosure of
inventions is a provision for granting the patent right, the right is thought to be a reward for
providing the technical information of the invention to the public (Ballard and Ballard v. Borden,
1952). In other words, the present IP system works to balance IP owners' interest through IP
monopolies and public interest through information disclosure. One may consider the current
system balances them, yet soon recognize it fails to do so once IP-specific and IP non-specific
external costs are taken into account. The proposed GIP system would establish a true balance
between IP monopolies and public interest including not only the disclosure of intellectual
creations but also responsibility for IP-related external costs.
CONCLUSION
One day Christopher Columbus was at a dinner which a Spanish gentleman had given in his
honor, and several persons were present who were jealous of the great admiral's success. ---
"You have discovered strange lands beyond the seas," they said, "but what of that? --- Anybody
can sail across the ocean; and anybody can coast along the islands on the other side, just as you
have done. It is the simplest thing in the world." Columbus made no answer; but after a while he
took an egg from a dish and said to the company: "Who among you, gentlemen, can make this
egg stand on end?" One by one those at the table tried the experiment. When the egg had gone
entirely around and none had succeeded, all said that it could not be done. Then Columbus
took the egg and struck its small end gently upon the table so as to break the shell a little. After
that there was no trouble in making it stand upright. "Gentlemen," said he, "what is easier to do
than this which you said was impossible? It is the simplest thing in the world. Anybody can do it,—
after he has been shown how!" (Olcott, 1914)
This anecdote is called "The Egg of Columbus," and it represents a typical example of
serendipity in discovery. Serendipity is a major driving force to produce a new creation when
different concepts meet over the boundary lines of individual disciplines. The GIP system is
comparable to the Columbus's egg because it results from the serendipitous meeting of the
current IP system and the greening of society. In other words, the GIP system itself is an
intellectual creation for greening a society. In addition, one creation induces other new creations
in the IP system, and this process would also work for the GIP system itself. The GIP system
could evolve the IP system itself to produce more green creations.
After reading this article, many may be surprised at the notion that the IP system has a possibility
of providing reconciliation between growth liberalism and "greenism." Typically, the IP system
has been depicted as the standard-bearer of economic growth and the natural enemy of
environmental concerns; however, there are two basic driving concepts that make the IP system
function as an engine to implement greenism. First, both the IP system and greenism can be
related to a common factor, i.e., intellectual creations. The IP system is the legal regimes most
involved in intellectual creations, and greening a society highly depends on the economic scale
of that society, the level of which intellectual creations determine. The second driving concept is
that both the IP system and greenism share the same final goal, i.e., long-term human
prosperity. The ultimate purpose of the IP system is not to promote intellectual creations blindly
but to advance human welfare. This purpose is typically represented by the fact that the IP
system defines "exclusions from patentability" (e.g., 35 U.S.C.§181-188, Secrecy order). This
provision means that the IP system will not publish an application or grant a patent for any
creation that violates public order or morals. In other words, any IP will not be granted for a
creation that has only harmful applications. The IP system aims to improve human welfare, and
this aim is identical to the final goal of greening a society. Based on these driving concepts, this
article has proposed the sophisticated infusion of greenism into the monopolistic principle of the
IP system, which would provide a concrete tool for greening a society through the progress of not
only green technologies but also green policies and social models. To ensure this progress,
the proposed GIP system would become a new funding system that promotes green intellectual
creations.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author appreciates valuable comments from Professor Herman E. Daly, University of
Maryland, USA, and Professor James Lee, American University, Washington, D.C., USA. Much of
discussion in this article is affected by two books: Daly, H.E. and Farley, J., 2004. Ecological
Economics: Principles and Applications. Island Press, Washington, D.C., and Daly, H.E. and
Townsend, K.N. (Editors), 1993. Valuing the Earth: Economics, Ecology, Ethics. MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA.
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Itaru Nitta
Green Intellectual Property Project, Maryland, USA and Wakabayashi Intellectual Property Law,
Tokyo, Japan
The Green Intellectual Property Project can be reached at www.greenip.org or +1-301-468-7353
(Phone / Facsimile).
ABSTRACT
The aim of this article is to introduce a drastic reform into the present intellectual property
(IP) system that would encourage the development of a truly affluent society while keeping
the economic scale at a sustainable level. The resulting system or "Green Intellectual
Property (GIP) system" would stimulate the progress of "green intellectual creations"
including advanced technologies, social models and policies. In this article, "green" means
"sustainable development-oriented" or "affluent societies reaching beyond traditional
economic growth." The GIP system would divert a part of ample IP-related monetary flow or
a "GIP fee" toward a monetary pool or a "GIP trust fund" for greening a society. IP-related
monetary flow includes official fees, license royalties and IP infringement compensations.
From this trust fund, the system would provide "GIP financial aid." If an institution needed the
product or service of a green intellectual creation and was unable to afford access to that
creation because of capital shortage or lack of technology and a social model, the GIP
system would offer the necessary financial support in the form of a soft loan and grant for
formulating or purchasing that creation or a royalty assumption for introducing that creation.
While the GIP financial aid would enable the financially weak to access the necessary green
intellectual creations, this aid would also provide benefits to GIP fee payers because it would
guarantee that they are able to collect early investments for formulating a new creation even
when its users do not themselves have enough financial power. As a result, the GIP financial
aid would raise originators’ incentives to formulate further green intellectual creations even
when the market is not fertile. These effects would lead to an increase in the number of IP
applications, which would eventually amplify the financial resources in the GIP system itself
for further financial aid. This self-incentive feature of the GIP system allows us to view its aid
as a "green investment." Through these GIP fees and financial aid, the GIP system could
address three economic aspects: the sustainable constancy of economic scale, the just
distribution of intellectual wealth and the efficient allocation of intellectual creations. While
many criticize that the current IP system fails to deal with these economic aspects, the
proposed GIP system could handle them in three different ranges of economic scope: the
ecological, macro and microeconomic.
INTRODUCTION
The traditional forms of intellectual property (IP) rights include patents, trademarks, designs,
copy rights and geographic indications. Generally, IP rights are exclusive legal rights with a time
limit or “lawful temporary monopoly” that is granted for intellectual creations as a reward for first
formulating a creation and disclosing the information of that creation (for other definitions for IP
rights, See e.g., Idris, 2003). This definition means that the IP system works to balance
monopolizing intellectual creations and sharing their information. Namely, the monopolistic
principle of the IP system protects the originator’s creation from intellectual theft such as
unauthorized use and imitation. Contrarily, the sharing principle of the IP system compels an
originator to disclose full information of her creation to the public before obtaining an IP right. IP
proponents believe that these principles of the IP system contribute to the progress of human
welfare through the activation of intellectual creations because the monopolies of intellectual
creations inspire originators' incentives to formulate more intellectual creations. Moreover, the
disclosure of intellectual creations releases new information which can enable new originators
to formulate further creations. The disclosure of intellectual creations also causes different
originators to avoid repeating the same effort to formulate the same creation, thus avoiding the
waste of time and investment. Joseph A. Schumpeter and many neoclassical economists have
asserted that IP rights, especially patent rights, induce technological progress. Technological
progress increases labor productivity and creates new business and jobs, which strongly
stimulates economic growth (e.g., Schumpeter, 1934).
However, this neoclassical economic approach has provoked criticisms from three different
economic perspectives that the current IP system causes undesirable outcomes (Daly and
Farley, 2004). From the broadest perspective, an undesirable situation is concerned with the
scale of economy which ecological economists emphasize. Ecological economists point out a
complete lack of respect for a sustainable scale of economy in the present IP system because
the system is based entirely on traditional growth-oriented economics. From the second widest
view of economics, an undesirable situation is related to distribution of income and wealth,
which is what macroeconomists address. Macroeconomists argue that the existing IP system
prevents a society from achieving just distribution of income and wealth because IP monopolies
promote the concentration of capital by an owner of an IP right. Increased capital concentration
is the financial driving force for further intellectual creations, yet increased capital results in a
larger gap between the rich and the poor. From the narrowest viewpoint, an undesirable
situation is involved with the allocation of resources, which is what microeconomists focus on.
Microeconomists claim that the IP system inevitably results in inefficient allocation in the market,
which originates with IP monopolies. While the information of intellectual creations is originally
intangible and therefore a free-accessible good, the IP system makes this information
inaccessible, which then leads to inefficient allocation of information in the market with higher
market prices than the equilibrium prices.
In contrast to these negative features, I have revealed positive features of the present IP system;
namely, the IP system has an unexamined but firm potentiality to propel the attainment of
sustainable development beyond mere stimulation of intellectual creations (Nitta, 2005). In an
earlier article, I have proposed drastic reform of the present IP system that would help society to
reduce environmental impact (Nitta, 2005). We could call the reformed IP system a "green IP
(GIP) system." Throughout the present article, "green" means "sustainable development-
oriented" or "affluent societies reaching beyond traditional economic growth." As a subsequent
study to my earlier proposal, this article demonstrates that the GIP system can circumvent
undesirable situations caused by the current IP system, and furthermore, the GIP system
strongly promotes the "greening" of a society. For this demonstration, we will begin with
arguments about the necessity of intellectual progress and the mechanism of the GIP system
which is generalized to include all forms of intellectual property. Subsequently, we will elucidate
the superiorities of the GIP system and its compatibility with economics.
GREEN INTELLECTUAL CREATIONS
To realize sustainable development, Herman Daly and other ecological economists have
affirmed that a society should reduce its economic scale to a sustainable level and keep that
scale at a constant where births are equal to deaths at the lowest rate and the input (depletion)
of resources into a society is equal to the output (pollution) of wastes to the environment at the
smallest amount. Ecological economists refer to this economic situation as the "steady-state
economy" (See, e.g., Daly and Townsend, 1993a). However, since the current growth-oriented
economy ultimately originates with humankind's inherited desire to progress, blind restriction on
the growth of human population and resource consumption cannot fulfill a constant economic
scale for sustainable development. Even extreme environmental protectionists do not think that
we should revert our standard of living back to the Stone Age in order to preserve or conserve the
natural environment. Most people, including economic growth liberalists and environmental
protectionists, want to enjoy the benefits of progress. To progress while keeping the economic
scale constant, we have to recognize that this constancy prohibits a society from increasing
population and throughputs (consumption) of resources; however, this does not mean that we
must deny the development of a more sophisticated society and higher quality of life. Daly
emphasizes the contrast between growth and development; namely, while growth makes
something bigger, development makes something better (Daly and Townsend, 1993b).
Distinguishing between growth and development brings us to a conclusion -- a feasible and
probably the sole way for us to progress while keeping the economic scale constant is not
making society's activities bigger but making them better, i.e., developing a truly affluent society
without increasing the consumption of resources. An affluent society is a society that provides
efficient and high-quality goods and services, which allows us to enjoy mental satisfaction, moral
progress and improved "art of life" (as proposed by John Stuart Mill) rather than the superficial
benefits of economic growth (Mill, 1848).
Much empirical evidence shows that the development of a society highly depends on the
progress of intellectual creations such as comprehensive technologies and broad-perspective
policies. In addition, the development of a society needs firm social system infrastructures and
institutions in order for us to do anything in that society because stable enforcement of well-
established social rules is a prerequisite for effective social development. We could call these
social systems and institutions "social models." These social models along with technologies
and policies comprise three major elements of intellectual creations. In particular, intellectual
creations for greening a society or "green intellectual creations" include three different types:
"green technologies," "green social models" and "green policies." These types can be
systematically defined according to the range of social scope, and they are essential to the
development of an affluent society with a constant economic scale.
Green Technologies
Green technologies are the narrowest-range green intellectual creations. They are concrete and
intensive technologies directed toward individual social phenomena, and they fall into two basic
classes. The first class is concerned with the traditional eco-friendly technologies such as those
related to output-reduction and input-reduction. Output-reduction technologies reduce
environmental pollutions. They typically include pollution control and technologies for the
restoration and remedy of environmental harms. Input-reduction technologies reduce resource
consumption in a society. They include technologies for efficiency improvement in resource
usage, reuse and recycling, renewable resources, environmental impact assessment, as well
as the precaution and prevention of environmental harms. While many researchers have
focused on output-reduction technologies, more effective green technologies are involved in
input-reduction. Input-reduction leads to a decrease in consumption of materials and energy
and curbs both depletion and pollution in the environment (e.g., McKinney and Schoch, 2003).
The second class of green technologies contributes to greening a society with more
comprehensive measures. These technologies are generally involved in human necessity, for
example medicine and health, hygiene, geriatric care, agriculture, foodstuff, juvenile and adult
education, poverty alleviation and infrastructures for human life. In addition, the second class is
related to social service improvements such as information and communications, social impact
assessment, the precaution and prevention of social harms as well as the restoration and
remedy of social harms.
Green Policies
Green policies are the broadest-range green intellectual creations. They are abstract and
extensive policies in politics and macroeconomics that provide guidelines for greening a
society. The primary example of green political policies is international environmental laws,
which include treaties, customary law, general principles and prevalent publications including
judicial decisions and the writings of eminent publicists (Article 38(1) of the International Court of
Justice Statute). A treaty is the written form of an international agreement between states (Article
2.1(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), and that form need not be called a treaty;
it can be called a convention, declartion, protocol, communique, agreement, or virtually any other
name (Hunter, et. al., 2002a). The two biggest international environment treaties are the
Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Agenda 21). Customary law is the unwritten
form of an empirical rule that states regularly obey. An example of customary law is the UN Law
of the Sea Convention. The general principles of international law are aspects in common that
states share such as the “Right to a Healthy Environment.” Green political policies also include
domestic environmental law, protocols and rules such as the U.S. Sky Trust.
On the other hand, green macroeconomic policies are the intellectual creations that address
sustainable scale of economy and just distribution of incomes and welfare. They also
encompass nonmarket goods and services which truly enhance human welfare. These targets
of green macroeconomic policies are mostly those which the market fails to deal with. One of
the best examples of green macroeconomic policies is the concept of the steady-state economy,
which we have already discussed. Another example of green macroeconomic policies is the
“principle of subsidiarity,” which was originally derived from a Catholic tenet, emerged through
the European integration and now functions in the present European Union (EU). This principle
means that what can be well done by a smaller and simpler institution should not be done by a
larger and more complex institution. Namely, we should solve local problems not with global
measures but local measures -- the EU government handles only the global EU's issues, and
local issues should be addressed by local governments.
Green Social Models
As we have seen, green intellectual creations include at least two elements: green technologies
as the narrowest creations and green policies as the broadest. To support the practical
applications of green technologies and the implementation of green policies, we additionally
introduce a middle-range creation: green social models. Since green policies provide only
general guidelines and they do not bestow specific instructions, we need green social models, i.
e., social systems and institutions that provide concrete procedures for the achievement of green
policies. Additionally, green social models could guide the trend of green technologies by acting
as super controls of technological developments to point technological progress in the right
direction. In this situation, green social models could be regarded as converters of philosophies
in green policies to green technologies which actually affect our lives.
A typical example of social models is the Official Development Assistance (ODA). The ODA is an
international institution that distributes financial and technological aid through the government or
governmental agencies of several developed countries including US, Japan and Germany. The
first-ever international organization for ODA was the Organization for European Economic Co-
operation (OEEC), which was established in 1948 with support from the US and Canada for the
reconstruction of Europe after World War II. In 1961, the OEEC expanded to include US and
Canada and became the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
ODA from the OECD was originally the social model to implement a governmental policy, the
Marshall Plan. ODA is also a social model to guide practical applications of various
technologies through vast financial aid provided by developed countries to developing countries.
This situation allows us to conceive of ODA as a kind of social models that has successfully
converted a public policy (the Marshall Plan) into technological progress through financial aid.
Another example of green social models is international financing institutions for protection of
the global environment. These institutions include pioneers that have already proven to be
useful such as the fledgling "micro-credit" programs (for example, the Grameen Bank), debt-for-
nature swaps (for example, that of the Beni River Region, Bolivia, by Conservation International,
USA) and national environmental funds. The green institutions also include usefulness-
unproven proposals such as the "Tobin Tax" and the Global Commons Trust Fund (Hunter, et.
al., 2002b).
GREEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (GIP) SYSTEM
As we have discussed, the major elements of green intellectual creations are advanced
technologies, social models and policies. Through strong progress in the formulation, practical
applications and wider prevalence of these intellectual creations, the ultimate objective of the
green intellectual property (GIP) system is to attain the development of a truly affluent society
while keeping the economic scale at a sustainable level. For this purpose, the GIP system
would divert a part of ample IP-related monetary flow or a "GIP fee" toward a monetary pool for
greening a society or a "GIP trust fund" (Nitta, 2005). IP-related monetary flow could include
official fees, license royalties and IP infringement compensations. IP applicants would pay a GIP
fee when they take a legal action to obtain an IP right and IP owners would also pay a GIP fee
when they earn income from a royalty and compensation. From the GIP trust fund, the GIP
system would provide financial aid for the formulation, practical applications and wider
prevalence of green intellectual creations. Specifically, if someone needed the product or service
of a green intellectual creation and such person was unable to afford to access that creation
because of capital shortage or lack of technology and a social model, the GIP system would offer
the necessary financial support in the form of a royalty payment for introducing that creation or a
soft loan and grant for formulating or purchasing that creation.
Establishing the GIP Trust Fund
A present, the current IP system has the superior ability to establish a GIP trust fund; namely, the
system has ample financial resources which are supported by the pro-patent policy within an
internationally-harmonized framework of strictly enforced laws (Nitta, 2005). In the case of the
patent system, the abundant financial resources of this system can be represented by the
statement, "a patent law is a law for rich people." These words mean that major players in the
present patent system are those who have enough financial power to create an invention and
then obtain and maintain its patent right. They pay various official fees that provide huge
amounts of revenue to the patent system. For example, the revenue of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) in 2004 was $230 million including $180 million (78%) of the
official fees for the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) applications (the author converted the
original Swiss franc to US dollar from the data of WIPO, 2005). The WIPO also predicts that its
total income will increase in the next five years based on the increase in PCT applications. In
another example, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) earned a total of $1.2
billion including $1.0 billion from patent official fees in the fiscal year 2003 (USPTO, 2004). Like
the WIPO, the USPTO also predicts that their total income will increase in the next several years
based on the increase in patent applications in and toward the US. These data indicate that
even just two patent offices' income will reach roughly $2 billion in the coming years from patent
applications alone. If the patent system allocated even a small portion of its vast income as the
GIP fees, the system could provide substantial financial resources to establish the GIP trust fund
without soliciting additional official fees.
Although the current official fees could already provide considerable revenue to the proposed
patent system, a hike of these fees would be relatively easy in the form of the GIP fees if the GIP
trust fund required more financial resources. For example, one patent application for one
invention in one foreign country costs roughly $6,000 which contains only $1,500 in official fees
and $4,500 that goes toward other expenditures such as translation and attorney fees (based on
the author's experiences). Because official fees are a much smaller part of the total cost, a
certain percentage increase in official fees would not appear to an applicant as a significant rise
of the total cost to obtain a patent right.
In addition to the income from official fees, the patent system has other potential financial
resources that could be generated by the monetary flows concerning patent activities. An
example of the patent-related monetary flows is royalty payment for a patent license from a user
to an owner. Another example is compensation payment for a litigation from a patent infringer to
an owner. These patent-related monetary flows provide industrial corporations a huge amount
of patent income. For example, in 2003, IBM earned $900 million in patent income, which is
equal to 1% of its total income of $90 billion (IBM, 2003). These patent incomes are equivalent
or more than the current revenues of the patent system from official fees. For the GIP trust fund,
the patent system could collect a part of these patent incomes in the form of green fees from
successful patentees.
Promoting Green Intellectual Creations
From the GIP trust fund, the GIP system would offer financial aid to promote green intellectual
creations in three different measures: the spread of existing creations, the practical application of
fledgling creations and the formulation of new creations. Looking at an example of the first
measure, in order to distribute already-established creations such as an HIV medicine, the
royalty for that HIV medicine could be paid by the GIP system rather than the medicine's users
such as African countries that cannot afford to pay. This royalty assumption by the GIP system
would strongly promote the distribution of green intellectual creations by two adroit features. The
first feature is the reconciliation between environmental protectionists (usually including green
creation's users) and growth liberalists (frequently including GIP fee payers such as IP
applicants and owners). While this royalty assumption would enable the financial weak to
access the necessary green intellectual creations, the assumption would also provide benefits
to GIP fee payers because the royalty assumption by the GIP system would guarantee that they
would be able to collect early investments for formulating a new creation even when its users do
not themselves have enough financial power. In other words, the royalty guarantee would justify
the GIP fees for GIP fee payers in a remarkable contrast to ordinary green taxes, which
unilaterally burden tax payers.
The second feature of the royalty assumption by the GIP system is the arousal of further green
intellectual creations that are not profitable for an IP owner but essential for greening a society.
For example, within the present framework of the existing IP system, pharmaceutical companies
may shift their development activities from an HIV medicine to more profitable medicines such
as an antipodagric for rich man's gout because rich men with gout in developed countries have
more money than HIV patients in developing countries. However, if the GIP system guaranteed
the royalty for an HIV medicine, pharmaceutical companies should shift their activities back to an
HIV medicine. Generally, the royalty guarantee would raise originators’ incentives to formulate
further green intellectual creations even when the market is not fertile. Since most markets of
green intellectual creations are still immature and many green creation's users do not have the
sufficient financial capacity to introduce green creations, the GIP system's guarantee would serve
as a catalyst for a wider prevalence of green intellectual creations.
In the second and third measures of financial aid from the GIP trust fund, the GIP system would
encourage the formulation of new green intellectual creations and the practical application of
fledgling creations as is the case with the prevalence of existing creations such as an HIV
medicine. For example, the system would provide soft loans or grants to assist basic research
for the formulation and launching new green creations which no society possesses but every
society needs. These green creations include novel green technologies (e.g., satellite
photovoltaic and nuclear fusion power generation), social models (e.g., a new financial
mechanism) and policies (e.g., a new treaty). In addition, the soft loans or grants from the GIP
system would also promote the practical usage of green intellectual creations which were
already formulated but have not matured yet. For instance, the GIP system would help users
purchase nascent but seminal green technologies such as solar and wind power generation.
Although these technologies usually have high prices due to IP protections and the small scale
of production, the GIP system’s financial aid could expand the market shares of such
technologies. This expansion induces mass-production of green technologies and decreases
the price of green technologies. As a result, the GIP system would effectively promote the
practical application of fledgling technologies in a society. Furthermore, the GIP system would
financially support the practical progress of trailblazing social models (for example, micro-credit
programs and debt-for-nature swaps) and polices. Through the encouragement of the formation
and application of these green creations, the soft loans and grants from the GIP system would
accomplish the reconciliation between GIP fee payers and users while stimulating the
development of green creations. These features are similar to those of royalty assumption.
Namely, the GIP system's soft loans and grants could stimulate users' intentions to purchase
green creations, which would expand the reach of emerging creations in a society. This would
provide benefits to GIP fee payers and inspire originator’s motivation for the formulation of further
green creations.
While distributing, maturing and formulating green intellectual creations, the financial aid from
the GIP trust fund would function as a self-amplifying investment which could address two major
root-causes of worldwide unsustainable growth: poverty in developing countries and
consumption in developed countries. To curb poverty-induced unsustainable growth in
developing countries, the GIP system would help developing countries introduce green
intellectual creations from developed countries. To reduce consumption-induced unsustainable
growth in developed countries, the GIP system would assist the formulation of new green
creations and the maturation of emerging creations. These financial supports from the GIP
system would expand green intellectual creations, which would enlarge the reach of green
intellectual creations in a society. This reach would lead to an increase in IP applications for the
GIP system. As a result, the increase in the number of IP applications would eventually amplify
the financial resources in the GIP system itself for further financial aid. This self-incentive feature
of the GIP system allows us to view its aid as an investment or a "green investment." This is
because these green investments would possess the same characteristics as ordinary loan
investments, which increase their original financial resources through interest. Contrarily, the
green investment would differ from ordinary green taxes, which do not increase their original
funds. In addition, the green investment would require, if needed, only a slight increase in the
total cost for obtaining an IP right and would not increase market prices in contrast to the
conventional green taxes, which internalize environmental externalities into market prices. While
a price increase due to a market-based internalization discourages the market, a non-price-
increase process through the proposed GIP system could encourage the green market while
keeping the economic scale at a sustainable level by promoting green intellectual creations.
That is to say, this non-price-increase process would provide a reconciliation for the conflict
between economic growth liberalists and environmental protectionists because such a process
would promote green intellectual creations without apparently suppressing the market. In
accordance with the desires of both liberalists and protectionists, the GIP system would provide
an approach to the development of an affluent society.
COMPATIBILITY OF THE GIP SYSTEM WITH ECONOMICS
In addition to the superiorities of the GIP system as we have argued, this system has a
remarkable compatibility with economics. Simply put, the GIP system could address the
sustainable constancy of economic scale, the just distribution of intellectual wealth and the
efficient allocation of intellectual creations. While many criticize that the current IP system fails to
deal with these economic aspects, the proposed GIP system could handle them in three
different ranges of economic scope: the ecological, macro and microeconomic scopes.
Pigouvian Effect: An Ecological Economic Aspect
From the broadest perspective of economics -- ecological economics -- the GIP system would
respect the sustainable scale of economy; namely, the system would have a limiting effect on the
scale of economy in a similar manner to the Pigouvian scheme. The Pigouvian scheme
requires the market to reflect neglected external costs. Once the market appropriately reflects all
these costs, it will spontaneously establish the efficient allocation of resources by achieving an
equilibrium between marginal social costs and benefits as a result of the Pareto optimum
(Pigou and Aslanbeigui, 2002). Internalizing external costs raises market prices and curbs
haphazard economic growth. Consequently, this internalization contributes to the attainment of a
constant scale of economy, and the sustainable constancy of economic scale is one of the major
concerns to ecological economists.
Within the Pigouvian scheme, one of the most notable social models is the Pigouvian tax, the
origin of present-day green taxes. The imposed Pigouvian tax is theoretically equal to marginal
external costs in order for the market to internalize externalities. The GIP fees for the proposed
GIP trust fund could be conceived as a pseudo-Pigouvian tax. This is because, even though the
GIP fees would not directly raise market prices, the fee payment would be a pathway to
internalize two kinds of external costs with which the current IP system has been involved. The
first category of such costs is "IP-nonspecific external costs." These are general external costs
attributed to inherent market failure. Products and services in any market ignore some external
costs because it is virtually impossible for the existing market system to consider all these costs
for a certain product or service. This is also true of the products and services that an IP right
protects; namely, IP-protected products and services inherently overlook external costs because
any activities of the IP system are based on these IP-protected products and services.
The second category of external costs that the IP system has been related to is "IP-specific
external costs." These costs are generated by the IP-system's ability to increase capital intensity
through monopolies. These monopolies help to concentrate capital or increase capital intensity
for a monopoly owner, and this heightened capital intensity then enables that owner to invest in
further development. Such IP-driven development results in consuming more resources and
generating more external costs. In this way, the IP system generates not only IP-nonspecific
external costs, but also extra IP-specific external costs. These costs could be internalized by the
payment of the GIP fees under the proposed system.
By looking at these external costs from an ethical perspective, a society should force the IP
system to pay a compensation for environmental and social degradation in the form of GIP fees.
The present IP system has contributed to environmental and social degradation through the
promotion of haphazard growth. Environmental and social degradation includes not only
traditional environmental threats but also social problems such as poverty, refugees, famine,
pestilence and war. This observation raises at least two arguments, especially for the present
patent system. First, the patent system has a responsibility to protect the environment and
society because the system is ultimately founded on sacrifices of the environment and society.
That is to say, the patent system encourages technological progress, and technological
progress stimulates economic growth as indicated by the endogenous economic growth model,
which states that technological progress induces more economic growth, which then results in
more technological progress (See e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1997). In this way, the patent system
activates economic growth, and economic growth causes environmental and social
degradation. Therefore, the patent system should pay the costs of such degradation in the form
of the GIP fees.
As for the second argument from an ethical perspective, developed countries carry the entire
responsibility to protect the global environment and society because they have enough financial
resources which the patent system has rendered as a result of the past and present sacrifices of
the global environment and society. In other words, developed nations are the beneficiaries of
the patent system. Therefore, these beneficiaries of the patent system -- patent applicants and
patentees in developed countries -- must pay compensation for the global environmental and
social degradation.
In addition to the tax, another notable social model of the Pigouvian scheme is the Pigouvian
subsidy. The Pigouvian subsidy is a society's payment as a reward to the social unit that
reduces external costs. The amount of the Pigouvian subsidy is ideally equal to the marginal
external costs that a social unit successfully reduces. The financial aid from the proposed GIP
trust fund would be nothing more than a Pigouvian subsidy because the GIP system would
provide such aid to users who reduce external costs by utilizing green intellectual creations.
Since the GIP fee and GIP financial aid would be a form of Pigouvian tax and subsidy
respectively, the GIP system as a whole would possess both features of these Pigouvian social
models. Moreover, the combination of these models would render the GIP system a remarkable
advantage which we could call the "Pigouvian effect." For example, some may criticize the GIP
fee because it could curb IP applications, and this curb might impede the progress of not only
traditional growth-oriented creations but also green intellectual creations. This criticism
ostensibly makes sense; however, the GIP system would actually inhibit only growth-oriented
creations and conversely promote green intellectual creations. This selective incentive for green
intellectual creations is the Pigouvian effect, which is a result of the combination of the GIP fee
(the Pigouvian tax) and the financial aid from the GIP trust fund (the Pigouvian subsidy). This is
because the GIP trust fund would guarantee an IP owner's collection of early investment in the
form of royalty payments while at the same time inspiring users' incentives to purchase creations
as long as those creations are green. In this circumstance, if the total amount of an applicant's
budget were limited and the GIP fee increased the total cost of all IP applications, applicants
would decrease the applications of growth-oriented creations and maintain or, if possible,
increase the applications of green intellectual creations. In other words, the Pigouvian effect
would encourage originators to formulate more green intellectual creations rather than traditional
growth-oriented creations. As a result, the GIP system could selectively expand green
intellectual creations.
Wealth Re-Distributor: A Macroeconomic Aspect
From the middle perspective of economics -- macroeconomics -- the GIP system would facilitate
a society achieving just distribution of income and wealth while increasing the concentration of
capital by the owner of an IP right. This phenomenon is attributed to the fact that the payment of
the GIP fees would set an upper limit on IP-related income, which corresponds to a
macroeconomic procedure known as "capping income and wealth." A traditional example of a
capping procedure is a tax for income and wealth, such as real estate, tangible properties and
heirlooms. These income taxes would be comparable to the GIP fee. A successful IP owner
acquires a huge amount of IP income from a royalty when that owner licenses an IP right. An IP
owner also obtains vast compensation for infringement on an IP right when that owner wins an
IP infringement suit. When an IP owner acquires these IP-related incomes, the GIP system
would demand that owner to pay the GIP fee based on the same logic of the ability-to-pay
principle for a regular income tax.
On the other hand, the GIP financial aid corresponds to another macroeconomic procedure
known as "guaranteeing minimum income," because the GIP financial aid would assist users to
access the necessary green creations. This guaranteeing procedure generally sets a lower limit
on individual income and wealth. Typical examples of guaranteeing procedure include welfare
programs in which a society provides monetary and material aid, unemployment insurance,
medical insurance and minimum wage.
Since the proposed capping and guaranteeing procedure would force the IP system to release
IP-related wealth to the economic weak who need green intellectual creations, the GIP system
could be regarded as a wealth re-distributor. By setting an upper and lower limit of income and
wealth, a wealth re-distributor would decrease the gap between the rich and the poor, which
would lead to just distribution of income and wealth in accordance with the principal aspect of
the macroeconomic policies.
There are at least two reasons why just distribution of income and wealth is critical to greening a
society. First, those who are too poor cannot afford to care about the environment and society.
Second, those who are rich tend to consume a large amount of finite resources. Poverty in
developing nations and resource consumption in developed nations are two major factors for
unsustainability. Nearsighted approaches for poverty alleviation urge developing countries
toward growth-oriented macroeconomic policies, which ignore environmental and social
concerns. To earn foreign currency for eliminating poverty, many developing countries depend
heavily on the exploitation and export of their natural resources. These exported resources allow
free consumption of natural resources in developed countries without respect for environmental
impact. From an ethical perspective, distribution policies should not deprive people of what they
have earned; however, people should pay a fair fee for what they have received from the
environment and society.
To reduce the gap between the rich and the poor for just distribution at a global level, the Rio
Earth Summit Secretariat estimated that developing countries annually need financial aid in the
amount of $125 billion from the international community (Agenda 21, Chapter 33.18, Financial
Resources and Mechanisms). However, the total ODA from OECD countries in 2004 reached
only $78.6 billion, and Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden were still
the only countries to meet the UN's ODA target of 0.7% of gross national income (DAC, 2005).
Moreover, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) is the largest international financial institution
specializing in technological adoption for the implementation of specific environmental
obligations, yet the GEF has provided only $4.5 billion in grants since 1991 (GEF, 2004). To
complement these existing financial mechanisms, the GIP system, an international wealth re-
distributor, would collect a part of IP-related wealth through each country's patent office or an
international patent organization such as WIPO or the World Trade Organization (WTO). Then,
the GIP system would distribute collected wealth through multilateral development banks such
as the World Bank or local financial institutions such as a micro-credit bank or debt-for-nature
swaps in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. Moreover, a new international funding
organization based on incomes from the IP system could be established through the initiative of
three leaders in the IP system, i.e., the US, the EU and Japan.
Accessibility Reinstatement and Responsibility Shift: A Microeconomic Aspect
Economics at the narrowest perspective is microeconomics, and one of the major objectives in
microeconomics is the efficient allocation of goods and services in the market. The GIP system
would contribute to the achievement of efficient allocation of intellectual resources through two
measures. The first measure would be the reinstatement of accessibility for green intellectual
creations while maintaining IP monopolies; namely, the GIP financial aid would reinstate
accessibility for the green creations to which the present IP monopolies block free access. IP
monopolies are the main engine for originator’s incentives for formulating new creations.
However, these monopolies make resulting creations inaccessible to unauthorized users, and
this inaccessibility prevents the market from functioning efficiently. For example, IP
inaccessibility allows an IP owner to set any desired price for that owner's creation, which is
usually much higher than the equilibrium price in an efficient market. This higher price inhibits
the smooth distribution of creations, which leads to their inefficient allocation. To eliminate the
inaccessibility caused by IP monopolies, the proposed GIP system would provide financial aid
that would make green intellectual creations accessible to aid recipients. Aid recipients could
pay royalty and purchase green creations to incorporate such creations into their society. This
reinstated accessibility would result in a smooth distribution of creations, which would then
realize efficient allocation of those creations in the market.
The second measure for efficient allocation would be a shift of responsibility for environmental
and social costs from society to IP applicants and owners. In order for IP applicants to establish
monopolies in the current system, their duty includes the payment of official fees and the
disclosure of intellectual creations, yet it does not contain the payment of IP-specific and IP-
nonspecific external costs. This situation demands that society pay those external costs despite
the fact that such costs have been generated by the IP system. In contrast, the proposed GIP
system would shift the responsibility for paying these costs from society to IP applicants and
owners. This responsibility shift would induce the effective internalization of IP-specific and IP-
nonspecific external costs. This internalization would release a society from unjust burden to
pay those IP external costs, which would lead that society to improved allocation of its financial
resources. By using financial resources that are no longer required for IP external costs, a
society could spend more expenditure for greening that society.
Even though the proposed GIP system would contribute to efficient allocation, some economists
may still question the necessity of the IP system, particularly the patent system, because of
several technologies such as computer software and electronics that patent-free industrial-
standard policies have successfully distributed (e.g., Bollier, 2003). However, patent-free
industrial-standard policies are usually of benefit only if a supplier has enough capital resources
to quickly penetrate its new technologies into the market. In contrast, we could easily predict that
capital-short but forward-thinking suppliers would develop many green technologies. These
suppliers need protections of their inventions through a patent system which would provide
financial resources for the development of green technologies. Moreover if the present patent
system did not exist, most suppliers would keep their technologies as trade secrets and people
would not be able to access or even learn those technologies until they became out-of-date and
suppliers disclosed them. This situation would result in more serious inefficiencies in the
market than the situation of the present patent system because most technologies are alive for
longer than the patent term which is usually 20 years.
However, even pro-patentists have argued whether patent monopolies actually contribute to the
progress of science and technology. Some inventors can be stimulated by patent monopolies,
but others, especially capital-short but forward-thinking suppliers, might be disappointed
because they could think that much research has already been done by giant enterprises. They
also might think that they could hardly create anything new that the giants do not already have a
patent on. This means that patent monopolies may eliminate the possibility of technological
progress. From the perspective of sharing information, it is preferable that anyone freely access
any useful invention. To overcome this contradiction caused by patent monopolies, the patent
system prescribes disclosure of inventions. Disclosure of inventions enables subsequent
inventors to catch up quickly to others with existing patents and overtake them.
To obtain a patent right, the invention should be disclosed to the public. Since the disclosure of
inventions is a provision for granting the patent right, the right is thought to be a reward for
providing the technical information of the invention to the public (Ballard and Ballard v. Borden,
1952). In other words, the present IP system works to balance IP owners' interest through IP
monopolies and public interest through information disclosure. One may consider the current
system balances them, yet soon recognize it fails to do so once IP-specific and IP non-specific
external costs are taken into account. The proposed GIP system would establish a true balance
between IP monopolies and public interest including not only the disclosure of intellectual
creations but also responsibility for IP-related external costs.
CONCLUSION
One day Christopher Columbus was at a dinner which a Spanish gentleman had given in his
honor, and several persons were present who were jealous of the great admiral's success. ---
"You have discovered strange lands beyond the seas," they said, "but what of that? --- Anybody
can sail across the ocean; and anybody can coast along the islands on the other side, just as you
have done. It is the simplest thing in the world." Columbus made no answer; but after a while he
took an egg from a dish and said to the company: "Who among you, gentlemen, can make this
egg stand on end?" One by one those at the table tried the experiment. When the egg had gone
entirely around and none had succeeded, all said that it could not be done. Then Columbus
took the egg and struck its small end gently upon the table so as to break the shell a little. After
that there was no trouble in making it stand upright. "Gentlemen," said he, "what is easier to do
than this which you said was impossible? It is the simplest thing in the world. Anybody can do it,—
after he has been shown how!" (Olcott, 1914)
This anecdote is called "The Egg of Columbus," and it represents a typical example of
serendipity in discovery. Serendipity is a major driving force to produce a new creation when
different concepts meet over the boundary lines of individual disciplines. The GIP system is
comparable to the Columbus's egg because it results from the serendipitous meeting of the
current IP system and the greening of society. In other words, the GIP system itself is an
intellectual creation for greening a society. In addition, one creation induces other new creations
in the IP system, and this process would also work for the GIP system itself. The GIP system
could evolve the IP system itself to produce more green creations.
After reading this article, many may be surprised at the notion that the IP system has a possibility
of providing reconciliation between growth liberalism and "greenism." Typically, the IP system
has been depicted as the standard-bearer of economic growth and the natural enemy of
environmental concerns; however, there are two basic driving concepts that make the IP system
function as an engine to implement greenism. First, both the IP system and greenism can be
related to a common factor, i.e., intellectual creations. The IP system is the legal regimes most
involved in intellectual creations, and greening a society highly depends on the economic scale
of that society, the level of which intellectual creations determine. The second driving concept is
that both the IP system and greenism share the same final goal, i.e., long-term human
prosperity. The ultimate purpose of the IP system is not to promote intellectual creations blindly
but to advance human welfare. This purpose is typically represented by the fact that the IP
system defines "exclusions from patentability" (e.g., 35 U.S.C.§181-188, Secrecy order). This
provision means that the IP system will not publish an application or grant a patent for any
creation that violates public order or morals. In other words, any IP will not be granted for a
creation that has only harmful applications. The IP system aims to improve human welfare, and
this aim is identical to the final goal of greening a society. Based on these driving concepts, this
article has proposed the sophisticated infusion of greenism into the monopolistic principle of the
IP system, which would provide a concrete tool for greening a society through the progress of not
only green technologies but also green policies and social models. To ensure this progress,
the proposed GIP system would become a new funding system that promotes green intellectual
creations.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author appreciates valuable comments from Professor Herman E. Daly, University of
Maryland, USA, and Professor James Lee, American University, Washington, D.C., USA. Much of
discussion in this article is affected by two books: Daly, H.E. and Farley, J., 2004. Ecological
Economics: Principles and Applications. Island Press, Washington, D.C., and Daly, H.E. and
Townsend, K.N. (Editors), 1993. Valuing the Earth: Economics, Ecology, Ethics. MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA.
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GREEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROJECT
A Tool for Greening Our Society
A Tool for Greening Our Society
GIP Progress, Summer, 2005